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Abstract 
This paper examines the problem of estimation bias when the effect of local 
competition on prices is investigated. The hotel industry was chosen as a 
representative case of industries that offer a spatially differentiated product. It is 
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1. Introduction 
Although the traditional monopolistic competition approach still plays a central 
role in textbooks on microeconomics to explain how a change in the number of 
firms affects market prices, nowadays there is a considerable array of theoretical 
models that offer alternative predictions about the phenomenon.
1
 In response to 
this situation, interest in the topic is turning increasingly toward the empirical 
testing of existing competitive models with real datasets, which are frequently 
obtained from different market structures. Empirical economists therefore often 
find themselves faced with the fact that the number of firms is highly correlated 
with unobserved but nonetheless relevant variables. This is the case where firms 
are more likely to be located in areas where consumer demand is higher. In this 
context, particularly careful analysis is required to shed light on the effect that the 
number of competitors has on prices from the conventional regression-based 
reduced form specifications. 
In many study cases, location is an important attribute for consumers and 
fortunately researchers know how sellers are spatially differentiated with respect 
to their potential competitors. Therefore, the introduction of spatial variables may 
help to alleviate potential estimation bias by capturing heterogeneity from 
demands and costs. A representative case, where location has been acknowledged 
as the most essential attribute for consumers, is provided by the hotel industry 
(e.g., Bull, 1994). Evidence suggests that, in this industry, costs play a secondary 
role in hotel room pricing behavior (see, for example, Kotas, 1986). However, 
distribution of unobserved consumer demand over space has previously been 
recognized as a relevant problem in the study of hotel pricing behavior. This is the 
case of one particular paper by Mazzeo (2002a)
2
, where the author introduced 
variables associated with the number of travelers in each motel location in order 
                                                          
1
 Some modern models offer predictions that are the contrary to those of the traditional 
monopolistic approach as regards the effect of competitors on price level. In this sense, price-
increasing competition is seen to be unexceptional from the theoretical perspective (e.g., 
Rosenthal, 1980; Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004; Chen and Riordan, 2008). Evidence about 
the phenomenon remains scarce at the present time (i.e., Ward et al., 2002; Thomadsen, 2007; 
Melzer and Morgan, 2009). 
 
2
 Mazzeo (2002a) and Mazzeo (2002b) also deal with the empirical treatment of endogeneity in the 
motel case when quantities or product choice are analyzed, respectively.  
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to prevent estimation bias when cross-sectional data is used for different markets 
(along U.S. interstate highways).  
To explore the benefits of control variables, in our case we focused on local 
competition in the metropolitan area of Madrid. This choice made it is easy to 
introduce information about the distance of sellers from certain points of interest 
for consumers in the city, as well as discrete variables associated to some 
geographical areas. The empirical strategy to define relevant geographical markets 
follows several previous studies based on local competition on the retail gasoline 
industry. Hence, as in Barron et al. (2004) and in Lewis (2008), we will address 
the issue of how competitors placed within a certain radius around the seller’s 
location affect their prices. Moreover, some extensions are performed in the 
present work. On the one hand, we will use the methodology recently developed 
by Kelejian and Prucha (2007) to prevent effects caused by heteroskedasticity and 
spatially autocorrelated disturbance terms. This procedure will be employed 
because unobserved effects related to location may be affecting the prices of 
closely located hotels and, hence, the regression disturbances are spatially 
dependent. On the other hand, since it is difficult to define the relevant market for 
each hotel, we will also explore whether our main results are robust to different 
radii. 
2. Data, estimation and results 
We consider a dataset of hotels inside the metropolitan area of Madrid
3
 (see Data 
appendix for variable description and data sources). Pricing behavior will be 
analyzed separately for a standard room on each of four consecutive weekdays, 
where there is likely to be a swap-over between leisure and business consumers. 
Associated to each sort of consumer preference, individual regressions will then 
allow us to capture specific intensities of demands across the metropolitan sub-
areas. 
We assume the following regression model: 
iiiii CSXp  
'''      (1) 
                                                          
3
 We decided to use the definition of this metropolitan area proposed by García Ballesteros and 
Sanz Berzal (2002), which comprises the city of Madrid and another 26 municipalities. 
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where pi is the logarithm of the lodging price set by hotel i (for a standard double 
room); Xi is a vector of lodging-specific characteristics; Si includes hotel-location 
variables to control heterogeneity in local demands (i.e. certain metropolitan sub-
areas are more attractive than others due to proximity to cultural settlements, 
airport, etc.); Ci represents the number of competitors around hotel i; and, lastly, i 
is a regression disturbance term. In the case that control variables for local 
demands to be omitted, the positive covariance between firm agglomeration and 
local demand intensity would introduce a positive bias in estimates of . 
We perform OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and spatial 
autocorrelation. Both complications can be taken into account with the consistent 
covariance matrix estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (2007).
4
 The 
estimates related to each of the consecutive days for both the complete 
specification and an alternative specification that omits the Si variables are 
reported. We are particularly interested in the estimates associated to Ci variables. 
More specifically, we split competitors into those that have the same category as 
the hotel under consideration (CloseComp) and those with a different category 
(OtherComp). 
In Table 1 we show results obtained assuming as relevant geographical market for 
each hotel in 200-meter radius (which is approximately the average nearest-
neighbor distance in the central districts). That is, all hotels which lie within a 
circle with this radius dimension are considered to be competitors of the hotel 
located at the center of the circle. Results for lodging-specific characteristics are 
quite similar in the two models. Most of the point estimates associated with the 
official hotel category are significant, thus indicating that the level of retail prices 
rises as new services are included and consumers are guaranteed better facilities. 
An exception is the inclusion of breakfast in room service. So, the weakly 
significant negative coefficient obtained for Thursday in the complete model 
could be because, in the presence of an excess capacity, sellers implement an 
aggressive strategy to capture consumers. In accordance with the higher 
                                                          
4
 In our application we use a Parzen kernel but, following the more recent analysis conducted by 
Lambert et al. (2008), with a larger bandwidth parameter than the one suggested by these authors. 
For the distance measure, dij, we use the Euclidean distance between each pair of hotels. 
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reputation of the AC and NH chains, the associated coefficients are all positive 
and, in most cases, strongly significant.
5
 Moreover, average price is also affected 
by the size of the hotels. If (unobserved) hotel production were positively 
associated with hotel size, this last result would capture the existence of 
economies of scale. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In general the geographic variables that are included have a significant effect on 
prices and are jointly significant (as suggested by the Wald-test). Specific results 
suggest that intensity of local demand is lower in the suburbs. Moreover, it is also 
lower the farther the hotel is from two focal points in the metropolitan area. The 
distance from the airport is strongly significant for every weekday, while distance 
from the city center has a significant effect only on weekend days (where leisure 
consumers are probably more relevant). Furthermore, it is not surprising that high 
economic activity is associated to more local demand for hotel lodging, but only 
on midweek days (where there are more business consumers). 
In accordance with the specification model that omits the Si variables, we obtain 
the puzzling result that closest competitors (CloseComp) are not relevant, while 
competitors with a product from a different category (OtherComp) would have a 
significant influence on pricing behavior. Moreover, if we test with sellers from 
different categories, we can show how the results could be erroneously interpreted 
as evidence in favor of price-increasing competition. In the results yielded by the 
complete specification model, the opposite effect of unobserved intensities of 
demand seems to have been largely eliminated. In fact, from sellers that provide 
the same quality product, we find that greater competitive pressure clearly implies 
a fall in average retail prices. Unsurprisingly, the effect is smaller when the 
competitor belongs to a different category.  
As indicated in the introduction, since we recognize the difficulty involved in 
defining the local relevant market for hotels, we further explore whether our 
findings are robust to increases in radii. In Table 2 we present the estimates 
related to closest competitors (CloseComp) and to different category competitors 
                                                          
5
 The “Key Audience Research” carried out by the Ipsos agency in 2008 on surveys among 
journalists indicated that the most highly valued chains in Spain are AC and NH. 
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(OtherComp) obtained from alternative dimensions for radii (i.e., for 400 and 600 
meters, which are the approximate average nearest-neighbor distances in the 
suburbs and in the surrounding municipalities respectively).
6
 Further results are, 
in general, consistent with the fact that the effect of local competitors on pricing 
behavior is progressively reduced as the average distance from them is increased. 
For example, in the complete specification model, a higher density of competitors 
with similar quality services (CloseComp) only reduces room price rates to a 
significant extent on Wednesdays and Thursdays when a radius of 400 meters is 
considered. Moreover, parameter estimates associated to different classes of 
competitors (OtherComp) are negative but not statistically significant (at the 
standard levels). 
Interestingly, the set of spatial variables are also statistically significant, which in 
turn suggests the importance of unobservable heterogeneity in the determination 
of local prices. In fact, when these control variables are omitted in the regressions, 
the estimated coefficients related with competitors’ density shifts toward a 
positive value. This allows us to illustrate how the coefficients associated to 
closest competitors (CloseComp) may also be mistakenly interpreted in favor of 
the price-increasing hypothesis. It is straightforward to show this from the 
regressions for Friday and Saturday, where these coefficients become significantly 
positive (in both the radii considered). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In sum, the outcome from this industry suggests that the unobserved distribution 
of demand can be very relevant in a spatially-differentiated context and could 
have a strong impact on the cross-sectional estimator. We have shown that in this 
case the introduction of spatial control variables, like the distance of sellers from 
some points of interest, is useful for the empirical analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
6
 For the sake of simplicity, in Table 2 we only address the effect of the variables CloseComp and 
OtherComp. The estimates for the remaining variables are remarkably insensitive to the choice of 
radius. The estimates for the remaining variables are available from the author upon request. 
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Data appendix 
Variable definitions 
On the one hand, the prices used correspond to lodging rates, including taxes, for 
one night in a standard double room. On the other hand, we divide characteristics 
of hotels into three vectors: Xi, Ci, Si where Xi includes variables related with 
perceived quality and the number of services offered. One important way of 
indicating higher quality of an establishment is the official number of gold stars 
(we use the dummies 3Stars, 4Stars and 5Stars for 3, 4 and 5 gold stars, 
respectively, where the reference group is 2 gold stars). The dummies AC, NH and 
Tryp-Meliá correspond to the names of the most important chains that operate in 
the Madrid area. Rooms is the number of rooms (in hundreds). Breakfast is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the reported price includes breakfast. 
In vector Si, we introduce two variables reflecting the logarithm of the Euclidean 
distances of each hotel from two focal points. We take into account the distance 
from the city center (DCenter) and we use the distance from the international 
airport (DAirport), which in turn is also near the Trade Fair Institution. A set of 
dummies distinguish hotels located in the suburbs (Suburbs), which are mainly 
residential and industrial districts, and in the surrounding municipalities (Metrop) 
that have important cultural and economic attractions. We also control for the 
level of economic activity by the logarithm of the GDP per capita of each 
municipality relative to the city of Madrid (RGDPpc). 
Data sources 
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The lodging rates were collected on June 25, 2008, from the GTA Hotels website 
(http://www.gtahotels.com), and correspond to every night from July 9 to July 12 
2008 (taxes included). The lodging rates in the sample account for approximately 
70% of the total number of hotels, i.e. 217 out of 315. The GDP per capita and 
locations for all of hotels in the metropolitan area were taken from the Statistical 
Institute of the Community of Madrid. Characteristics of hotels were obtained 
from the “Guía Oficial de Hoteles, 2008, Turespaña, Ministerio de Industria, 
Turismo y Comercio”. 
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Table 1. Estimation results based on radii (r) of 200 meters  
 Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
Constant 4.3656 *** 4.8470 *** 4.3814 *** 4.8532 *** 4.2882 *** 4.8341 *** 4.3658 *** 4.8446 *** 
 [0.0615] [0.1107] [0.0684] [0.1187] [0.0712] [0.1089] [0.0856] [0.1149] 
3stars 0.1562 ** 0.1844 *** 0.1353 * 0.1610 ** 0.1299 * 0.1483 ** 0.0627 0.0824 
 [0.0656] [0.0623] [0.0713] [0.0676] [0.0761] [0.0743] [0.0912] [0.0891] 
4stars 0.4123 *** 0.3993 *** 0.4036 *** 0.3889 *** 0.3151 *** 0.3041 *** 0.2456 *** 0.2360 *** 
 [0.0799] [0.0700] [0.0846] [0.0747] [0.0789] [0.0686] [0.0920] [0.0813] 
5stars 1.0932 *** 1.0298 *** 1.0630 *** 0.9940 *** 1.0829 *** 0.9844 *** 1.0093 *** 0.9242 *** 
 [0.1106] [0.0937] [0.1155] [0.0976] [0.1293] [0.1015] [0.1407] [0.1186] 
Breakfast -0.0326 -0.0598 -0.0330 -0.0711 * 0.0654 * 0.0153 0.0536 * 0.0197 
 [0.0381] [0.0372] [0.0384] [0.0370] [0.0335] [0.0334] [0.0304] [0.0300] 
AC 0.3223 *** 0.3571 *** 0.3155 *** 0.3487 *** 0.0657 0.0911 0.0595 0.0866 
 [0.0589] [0.0608] [0.0587] [0.0589] [0.0760] [0.0641] [0.0734] [0.0614] 
NH 0.4492 *** 0.4116 *** 0.4398 *** 0.4061 *** 0.1658 *** 0.1137 *** 0.1645 *** 0.1215 *** 
 [0.0531] [0.0404] [0.0536] [0.0408] [0.0539] [0.0398] [0.0522] [0.0379] 
Tryp-Meliá -0.0078 -0.0196 -0.0436 -0.0598 -0.0126 -0.0228 0.0133 0.0099 
 [0.0373] [0.0457] [0.0517] [0.0562] [0.0361] [0.0344] [0.0296] [0.0338] 
Rooms -0.0484 *** -0.0555 *** -0.0439 *** -0.0498 *** -0.0477 *** -0.0518 *** -0.0457 *** -0.0509 *** 
 [0.0143] [0.0121] [0.0152] [0.0131] [0.0184] [0.0156] [0.0154] [0.0138] 
Metrop  -0.0158  -0.0192  0.0064  -0.0078 
  [0.0808]  [0.0791]  [0.0846]  [0.0767] 
Suburbs  -0.2419 ***  -0.2307 ***  -0.1967 ***  -0.1612 *** 
  [0.0653]  [0.0687]  [0.0623]  [0.0556] 
DAirport  -0.1374 ***  -0.1294 ***  -0.1330 ***  -0.1177 *** 
  [0.0338]  [0.0356]  [0.0307]  [0.0299] 
DCenter  -0.0183  -0.0235  -0.0784 ***  -0.0680 *** 
  [0.0241]  [0.0261]  [0.0276]  [0.0207] 
RGDPpc  0.2958 ***  0.2884 ***  0.0538  0.0659 
  [0.0552]  [0.0554]  [0.0635]  [0.0601] 
CloseComp -0.0097 -0.0173 *** -0.0096 -0.0177 *** 0.0018 -0.0092 ** 0.0010 -0.0088 ** 
 [0.0060] [0.0056] [0.0061] [0.0057] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0035] [0.0037] 
OtherComp 0.0191 *** 0.0021 0.0181 ** 0.0001 0.0295 *** -0.0026 0.0297 *** 0.0011 
 [0.0074] [0.0067] [0.0076] [0.0074] [0.0072] [0.0091] [0.0059] [0.0058] 
         
Mean of dep. var. 4.7444 4.7444 4.7471 4.7471 4.6192 4.6192 4.6295 4.6295 
S.D. of dep. var. 0.3748 0.3748 0.3755 0.3755 0.3484 0.3484 0.3319 0.3319 
R2 0.5408 0.6329 0.5298 0.6180 0.4843 0.5778 0.5105 0.5944 
Chi-square (5)  86.07 ***  76.92 ***  47.41 ***  61.33 *** 
Standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation are between brackets (Parzen 
kernel with bandwidth parameter dn = 1650 meters). Significant estimates and statistics at the 10%, 5% or 
1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2. Effect of competitors based on alternative numbers of meters for radii (r) 
 Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
r= 400         
CloseComp -0.0005 -0.0061 ** -0.0008 -0.0066 ** 0.0076 * 0.0006 0.0070 * 0.0009 
 [0.0033] [0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0030] [0.0039] [0.0032] [0.0039] [0.0032] 
OtherComp 0.0049 -0.0021 0.005 -0.0021 0.0071 * -0.006 0.0076 ** -0.0034 
 [0.0034] [0.0048] [0.0038] [0.0052] [0.0039] [0.0066] [0.0036] [0.0054] 
R2 0.54 0.64 0.53 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.52 0.60 
Chi-square (5)  82.24 ***  75.92 ***  35.15 ***  37.88 *** 
         
r= 600         
CloseComp 0.0014 -0.0034 0.0017 -0.0032 0.0084 ** 0.0025 0.0084 ** 0.0029 
 [0.0032] [0.0028] [0.0036] [0.0033] [0.0039] [0.0029] [0.0041] [0.0033] 
OtherComp 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0023 -0.0034 0.002 -0.0033 
 [0.0022] [0.0034] [0.0027] [0.0038] [0.0027] [0.0042] [0.0030] [0.0042] 
R2 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.62 0.51 0.58 0.53 0.60 
Chi-square (5)  79.44 ***  71.60 ***  32.24 ***  32.10 *** 
Standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation are between brackets (Parzen 
kernel with bandwidth parameter dn = 1650 meters). Significant estimates and statistics at the 10%, 5% or 1% 
levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. (1) and (2) refer to estimates obtained from 
specification regressions without spatial control variables and with these variables, respectively.  
 
